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DEBTORS' EXEMPTION LAWS: TIME FOR MODERNIZATION'
G. STANLEY JOSLINt
The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary com-
forts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting
a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale, for the
payment of any debt ....
IND. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
Whether the need for some exemption of a debtor's property from
seizure by his creditors is basically for the protection of a debtor, his
family or for the benefit of the community generally, the institution is
now universal and beyond challenge. The extent to which the exemptions
should go, however, may be of considerable disparity when considered by
reasonable men, and a modernized exemption law might well be con-
sidered controversial as to the amount of exemption which should be
granted. The concern here is not primarily with a determination of the
value of exemptions which should be given, but the problem of the neg-
lect by the various jurisdictions to reconsider the exemption laws so as
to give currently the protection which each jurisdiction intended to grant
at an earlier time and would now grant if re-examined anew. In 1855
Massachusetts provided an exemption for tools, implements and fixtures
necessary for carrying on a trade not exceeding one hundred dollars in
value.2  This has not been changed. Georgia currently exempts one
1. The general archaic condition of exemption laws has been a source of concern
to the author for the last decade. To verify or dispel this apprehension, a current study
(1958) was made of the exemption laws of twenty-two jurisdictions selected on a diver-
sified geographical, economic and population base. The jurisdictions included in this
sampling study were: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. After this survey, the apprehension as to the inadequacy of present day
exemption laws was greatly increased. Generalizations and conclusions are based pri-
marily upon the study of the exemption laws of these twenty-two states but it is believed
to be a fair sampling and, in all probability, is an accurate picture of the general prob-
lem of exemptions in the United States today. Author.
t Professor of Law, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia.
2. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 235, § 34 (1955).
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horse or mule or one yoke of oxen, and one loom and one spinning
wheel.' The contention here is not that exemption laws were ill advised
but that the economic and social background has so radically changed
that a re-evaluation of the exemption needs should be made and the whole
area of exemptions revamped to reflect the present and probable future
requirements of individuals, families and society generally in the inter-
relationship between the debtor and his creditors. The exemption to the
farmer of one horse was a very important right. The exemption of one
tractor may now be just as important.
EXEMPTION LAWS AS TO FLEXIBILITY
Exemption laws generally may be classified into three types as to
their flexibility in application to unfolding and changing economic con-
ditions.' The first may be designated the crystallized type. This is the
old fashioned method of fixing exemptions by a name certain or spe-
cified fixed dollar amount. For example, Illinois exempts one hundred
dollars worth of household furniture and, in addition, when the debtor
is the head of a family and resides with them, three hundred dollars
worth of other household furniture. This was last amended in 1933.
Such a fixed dollar exemption cannot in any manner adjust itself to
changing conditions and will be out of balance during much of its ex-
istence. The only currency comes from frequent legislative enactment
or amendment which in fact does not keep pace but results in an ever
expanding imbalance.6  The crystallization may also come through the
naming of specific exempt articles. California, for example, exempts
one stove and one radio, and added one television receiver in 19552,
Maine exempts twelve cords of firewood,8 Missouri, spinning wheels,'
New Hampshire, one horse,1" and New Mexico exempts cabinets of
natural history.1 These expressed exemptions were laudible at the time
made and may have some remote value at the present time, but it is clear
that the real exemptions granted by the enactment have almost vanished,
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1301(2), (7) (1937).
4. The economic changes referred to here are not the sudden or violent economic
changes of the nature of 1929 and 1930, but the more gradual economic evolution of
decades, as for example 1932 to 1958.
5. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 13 (Third) (Smith-Hurd 1951).
6. Massachusetts is a case in point on the attention necessary, and seldom found, to
keep the statutory provisions current. Before 1947, wages not exceeding $20 a week
were exempt. In 1947, the exemption was changed to $25 per week, in 1951 to $30 a
week, and in 1956 to $40 a week. Ed. note to MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 246, § 28 (1955).
7. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 690.2.
8. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 112, § 67(1) IV (1954).
9. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.435(3) (1949).
10. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 511.2 (1955).
11. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-1 (1953).
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and unless supplemented, the debtors' minimum protective shield has
withered or disappeared to the extent that the specifically named article
is no longer a necessity in the individual's life. Other articles of as great
a necessity, but not covered by the exemption laws, have taken their place.
This unyielding designation of exemptions by narrow names' or
fixed dollar amounts may in some respects be advantageous to the credi-
tor as he is able to ascertain with relative certainty the extent of the
debtor's assets which may be available to him. However, with the legis-
lative lag evident in exemption legislation, it is clear that exemption laws
should be modernized with more flexible exemption standards. For ex-
ample, the life, usefulness and fair application of a flexible wage exenmp-
tion such as one third of the monthly in come is great, while the proper
function of a one hundred dollar a month wage exemption, even if ade-
quate when enacted, could well be in great imbalance within a few years.
An example of an exemption statute which removes the obsolescence
problems resulting from specific word designation is the California pro-
vision that exempts tools or implements used for a livelihood." This
designation gives a fluidity which permits adjustment to changing con-
ditions, whereas the designation in another section of the California law
exempting one piano1" illustrates the inflexibility of narrowly designated
objects of exemption.
The second type of exemption laws based upon flexibility is the
open designation, such as provisions exempting all necessary farm imple-
ments,"4 books necessary for professional men,'" all life insurance pay-
able to the wife irrespective of amount,"0 earnings necessary for the use
of the family,' or wages of any laborers.' It will be readily seen that
such designated exemptions are extremely fluid and open-ended. The
guide for determination is apt to be that which is found to be a reason-
able exemption, or a blanket exemption with no limits. This type ex-
emption will easily adjust its scope and effect to new situations as they
develop and will give the same insulation to debtors in every decade. An
exemption given a farmer, covering all necessary farm equipment, under
a 1930 economy will be as equitable in 1960 as it was when enacted.
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.4. North Carolina escapes from the rigidity of the
specific article designation by exempting personal property to a specified value. See
N.C. CoNsT. art. X, § 1.
13. CAL. CIv. PROc. -CODE §-690.2.
14. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513, 453(1) (1949); OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, .§ 1(4), (5) (1951).
15. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.435(11) (1949).
16. See, e.g., New Hampshire, N.H. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 408:1 (1955) and New
York, N.Y. INs. LAw § 166.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362 (1953).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1930).
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The principal objection to the uncharted exemption grant is the un-
certainty on the part of creditors as to the extent of a debtor's available
assets. What, for example, is the extent of an exemption which pro-
vides "all implements of husbandry used upon the homestead,"'" or "earn-
ings [necessary] for the use of a family" ?2" It does seem that such un-
guided exemption, left only to the current courts' interpretation of that
which is necessary, if extended to a broad area of debtor's assets, would
militate strongly against the ability to obtain unsecured credit.
The third type of exemption law gives reasonable flexibility with
some degree of certainty of ascertainment. These are the attempts to
draft the exemption law so as to give effect to that degree of exemption
the legislator believes desirable now and in future decades under chang-
ing economic conditions, whether they be inflationary or recessive. An
illustration of this type exemption law which is more frequently used in
present modernization is Indiana's statute, which provides that income
or profits of whatever nature of not more than fifteen dollars per week
shall be exempt, but if such income or profits exceed fifteen dollars a
week, then ninety per cent of such income and profit in excess of the
sum of fifteen dollars per week is exempt and ten per cent is subject to
execution.2 ' This provision was enacted in 1937 when a sixty dollar a
month exemption may well have been adequate. Today, with a very dis-
parate economic situation, that exemption expands with the income, and
provides a substantial protective shield to the wage earner for maintain-
ing himself and his family as against the claims of his creditors. This
type exemption is not wide open as the "reasonably necessary" exemption
and not closed as the absolute, one value exemption, but gives an adjust-
able base which adapts itself to changing circumstances. In 1949 Ala-
bama changed from a twenty-five dollar a month wage exemption to a
sixty per cent exemption. 2 This provides greater fluidity downward
than does the Indiana type statute.
Although the percentage type exemption may give the greatest con-
trolled fluidity, there are other methods of giving the guided adaptability
of the type three exemption. This may be done by the catch all exemp-
tion with a dollar value limit. For example, the exemption not of specific
items such as oxen, rakes, or plows, but of farming utensils,22 and not
of a horse and buggy, but a vehicle used for transportation. 24 The dollar
19. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(4) (1951).
20. See note 17 supra.
21. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3501(d) (Burns 1946).
22. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 630 (1940).
23. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-1 (1953).
24. Ibid.
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value limit may be important, for the broader the class of items exempted,
the greater the probability that in changing times, selected or designated
items would extend the exemption beyond its intended scope. For in-
stance, an unlimited exemption of a vehicle used for transportation could
well extend an exemption far beyond any justification.
Under this third type an extremely broad exemption area with selec-
tive privilege is used in some jurisdictions." Instead of detailed, de-
scriptive, itemized exemptions, or exemptions to narrow classes of items,
a broad exemption is given, as "real and personal property . . . to be
selected by [the debtor] . . .to the value of not exceeding two thousand
dollars."2'  This gives adequate elasticity as to the selected items deemed
necessary with changing times and for persons in varying occupations,
but the dollar value limitation is apt to be out of date within a few years
after enactment.
Although the concern here is primarily with an automatically ad-
justable exemption so that the changing economic pattern will be met,
there is another area of needed flexibility in even a constant economic
situation. This type exemption is also included in the "type three" here-
in used for pigeonholing purposes. This exemption expands and con-
tracts its coverage in escalator fashion as certain situations develop with
respect to the persons to be aided and protected by the exemption. Ex-
amples of this are found in Utah where a homestead exemption not ex-
ceeding two thousand dollars for the head of the family is allowed, with
a further sum of seven hundred fifty dollars for a spouse and three hun-
dred dollars for each member of the family,V 7 and in Virginia where
wages are exempt to seventy five per cent but never less than one hundred
dollars per month, nor more than one hundred fifty dollars per month,
provided the minimum and maximum is increased by fifteen dollars per
month for each dependent child.2" A statute of the Virginia type gives
great flexibility in both its capacity to adapt itself to the general change
in economic conditions and at the same time adjust its coverage to meet
the changing situation of the individual beneficiary of the exemption
laws. This elastic type exemption, which adjusts both to the general
economic climate and also the changing needs of the individuals, is de-
serving of careful consideration in any plan for the modernization of
exemption laws.
Basically the conflicting pressures from which exemption laws are
amalgamated seem to be certainty vs. flexibility. The hypothetical credi-
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (1950).
26. Ibid.
27. UTAH CODE ANN. § 28-1-1 (1953).
28. VA. CODE AxN. § 34-29 (1950).
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tor demands to know exactly what items and how much are exempt. The
hypothetical debtor and those interested in his well being desire a reason-
able minimum protection to be afforded at all times no matter what
changes take place. Legislative currency being unlikely, the problem is
one of devising a legislative pattern which treats both interests in an
equitable manner. The crystallized closely defined exemption of type
one gives the creditor certainty but is inadequate to give the debtor
needed relief in changing times. The uncharted exemption of type two
keeps pace with the debtor's needs but leaves the creditor bewildered and
with little possibility at any given time of knowing just what assets are
available to him. Thus there is the likelihood that any levy will be nul-
lified by the selection of the object of the levy as exempt property. Such
a situation inevitably would militate against unsecured credit. The
guided flexibility of type three seems to be the answer, wherein there is
substantial fluidity yet with charted limitations which make the ascertain-
ment of available assets reasonably calculable. In a consideration of spe-
cific exemption areas, such as life insurance, homestead, wage exemp-
tions, professionals' exemptions, laborers' and farmers' exemptions, here-
inafter to be discussed, the possibility of the use of the semi-flexible
exemption in modernizing each will be explored.
A RE-EXAMINATION OF EXEMPTION AREAS
Wage or Income Exemption. Some exemption of wages, salaries,
income or profits is universally recognized in the United States.2" The
variance in scope of the exemption given, however, is great. Florida at
one extreme exempts all money due for the personal labor or services of
any person who is the head of the family and residing in that state,"0 and
Pennsylvania exempts wages of any laborers, or the salary of any per-
son,3 while Virginia has a maximum exemption of one hundred fifty
dollars a month. 2 It is not the purpose here to dispute the amount of
exemption but to discuss methods of modernizing wage exemption stat-
utes so that the determined exemption need will be available over a long
period of time. The trend of the last several years has been to meet the
rapidly increasing wage and salary income, and greatly increased cost of
29. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.11; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.11 (Supp.
1958) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 46-208 (Supp. 1958) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3501 (d) (Burns 1946) ;
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 246, § 28 (Supp. 1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2-27 (Supp.
1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362 (1953) ; OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(F) (Baldwin
1953) ; O.A. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(16) (Supp. 1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1930) ;
S.C. CODE § 10-1731 (1952); UTA CODE ANN. § 78-23-1(7) (1953); VA. CODE ANN. §
34-29 (Supp. 1958).
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.11 (1943).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1930).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1958).
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living by percentage exemptions.3 Indiana gives a ninety per cent ex-
emption of all income over fifteen dollars a week,34 Alabama exempts
sixty per cent," California exempts one-half of the earnings, 6 Georgia,
fifty per cent over three dollars per day,37 New Mexico, eighty per cent,3"
Ohio, eighty per cent of first two hundred dollars and sixty per cent of
the balance,39 Oklahoma,4" and Virginia,4 seventy-five per cent. Many
of these statutes have limiting maximum and minimum provisions and
this aspect will be considered later, but it will readily be seen that the
percentage exemptions given are very disparate in the various statutes.
The desirability of a percentage wage exemption statute does seem clear.
This gives a fluidity of exemption coverage which over a period of time
is adequate as to the debtor and yet gives the creditor a degree of cer-
tainty for his guidance in credit extension and the exercise of his reme-
dies. If it were decided in 1930 that the need for wage exemption at
that time was eighty per cent of the monthly wage, that same percentage
exemption will in all probability be as necessary in 1960, even though the
average wage in the 1930's may have been one hundred dollars a month
and may be five hundred dollars a month in the 1960's. A definite ex-
emption value, set for example at eighty dollars a month in the 1930's
and justifiable then, would be totally inadequate today.
However, a completely open percentage exemption would not seem
desirable. If wages were exempt to eighty per cent of the monthly wage,
for example, and no minimum limitation were provided,42 each wage
earner would be subject to process each month with the resultant pro-
cedural difficulties, delay, and the probability of friction between the
particular employee and his employer, resulting from repetitious wage
33. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 630 (Supp. 1955); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.11;
GA. CODE ANN. § 46-208 (Supp. 1958) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3501 (d) (Bums 1946) ; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 26-2-27 (Supp. 1957); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(F) (Baldwin
1953) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(16) (Supp. 1957) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1958).
34. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3501(d) (Bums 1946).
35. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 630 (Supp. 1955).
36. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.11.
37. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-208 (Supp. 1958).
38. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2-27 (Supp. 1957).
39. Onia REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(F) (Baldwin 1953).
40. OKLA. STAT. fit. 31, § 1(16) (Supp. 1957).
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1958).
42. E.g., New Mexico provides, wages can be garnished for not more "than twenty
per cent [20%] of any wages or salary due such defendant for the last thirty [30] days'
service, unless the wages or-salary due said defendant exceeds one hundred dollars
($100) per month, garnishment may be had for twenty per cent [20%] of one hundred
dollars ($100) of such wages and salary and, in addition thereto, for full amount of the
excess of such wages or salary above one hundred dollars ($100)." N.M. STAT. ANN. §
26-2-27 (Supp. 1957). Oklahoma provides an exemption of 75% of the wages earned
during the last 90 days and provides no lower limit. OKLA. STAT. fit 31, § 1 (16) (Supp.
1957).
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garnishment or similar proceeding. On the other hand, with a minimum
wage completely exempt and the percentage exemption applying only to
the excess, many wage earners will be completely free from seizure
processes while they are within the minimum level of absolute exemption.
The minimum wage fully exempt in Indiana is fifteen dollars a week,4 3
in Georgia, three dollars per day,4" Ohio, sixty dollars a month,4 Utah,
fifty dollars a month,4" and Virginia, a recently increased minimum, one
hundred dollars a month. These current statutes which do provide a
completely exempt minimum wage seem to vary from fifty dollars a
month to one hundred dollars a month. It is to be noted, however, that
the exemption given the wage earner is extended upward by the per-
centage exemption allowed above the minimum. The evil in a too small
minimum exemption is not that a sufficient over-all exemption is in-
adequate, but that the wage earner and his employer are subjected to
process in a pestiferous manner and in piddling amounts. It might be
said that no creditor would act where the available amount is small, but
as a practical matter the right to use the process can be a weapon unjustly
used. For example, the Indiana wage exemption statute gives a mini-
mum exemption of fifteen dollars a week with ninety per cent exemption
to all in execess.48 The total exemption is very beneficent toward the
debtor but he is subject to a possible weekly seizure of any wages over
fifteen dollars a week for the ten per cent not exempt and all pressures
which are exerted in such situations. It seems then that a modern wage
exemption statute should provide a percentage exemption with an ade-
quate minimum wage or income completely exempt. It is true that this
stated crystallized minimum will get out of balance quickly if economic
conditions change, but the effect of imbalance is minimized by the super-
imposed percentage exemption.
A device to avoid the rigidity of a crystallized minimum amount, or
for that matter, any stated value exemption, would be to tie the statutory
level to regularly published indices, such as cost of living and wage data.
Economic changes each year would adjust the minimum exemption in re-
lation to them, thus resulting in a current fair and adequate protection to
the wage earner and at the same time give the degree of certainty and
foreseeability essential to the creditor. No wage exemption statute of
43. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3501(d) (Burns 1946).
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-208 (Supp. 1958).
45. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(F) (Baldwin 1953).
46. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-1(7) (1953).
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1958).
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3501(d) (Burns 1946).
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this type is observed, but its possibility should be explored in a moderni-
zation of wage exemption laws.
The next question is whether there should be some maximum limi-
tation on the wage exemption. Although the point at which the exemp-
tion should cease would be a subject of diversified opinion, it is con-
sistent with the philosophy of exemption laws to retain in the debtor a
basic necessary income and to subject fully, income above that level to the
claims of creditors. Virginia adopts the closed-end wage exemption by
providing that wages in excess of one hundred fifty dollars are fully sub-
ject to creditors,"' and New Mexico provides that any wage or salary
above one hundred dollars for the last thirty days is liable to creditors to
the full amount above one hundred dollars."0 The problem presented by
the closed-end wage exemption is the same as that raised by any crys-
tallized exemption in that it tends to become obsolescent as the economic
picture changes.
In adjusting wage exemption laws the most salutary legislation
would provide an absolute fully exempt minimum wage, a maximum
wage the excess of which would be fully subject to creditors' claims, and
a percentage exemption of the wages between the minimum and maxi-
mum. The Virginia statute is an example."' It provides an absolute full
exemption of wages to one hundred dollars a month and no exemption on
any excess over one hundred and fifty dollars, with a seventy five per
cent exemption on intermediate sums."
Although the closed-end, intermediate percentage wage exemption
statute considered above covers the general requirments of such an ex-
emption, some variations have been used in an attempt both to allow a
more fluid adjustment to general economic conditions and to adjust to
the singular changes of the individual debtor. Thus, instead of a single
percentage exemption an escalator type percentage exemption is used.
The Ohio Code gives an example. Here eighty per cent of the first two
hundred dollars earned within thirty days is exempted and sixty per cent
of the balance.5" The second escalator type adjustable wage exemption
is levered to changing circumstances of the individual debtor. This at-
tempts to give a fluidity of exemption which may expand or contract with
the changing minimum need of the wage earner. One example of this
type statute, extant today, provides that wages are exempt to seventy-five
49. VA. CODE AN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1958). This statute has an escalator provision
concerning dependent children which will be considered later herein.
50. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2-27 (Supp. 1957).
51. VA. CODE AiN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1958).
52. Ibid.
53. See note 45 supra.
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per cent, but never less than one hundred dollars nor more than one hun-
dred fifty, provided such minimum and maximum shall increase by fif-
teen dollars per month for each dependent child. 4 Thus an absolute
exemption of one hundred dollars a month for a wage earner with no
children would progress with his developing family of five to one hun-
dred and seventy-five dollars a month. The maximum limitation would
similarly increase. Later as the children became independent, this slid-
ing scale type exemption would retract as the wage earner's responsibility
lightned. Although these escalator or sliding scale type exemptions give
less prognosticability to the creditor, it does seem that their considera-
tion in the drafting of modern wage exemptions is warranted as a closer
reflection of the minimum basic needs of the wage earner both in his
changing family situation and the vacillating general economy.
Homestead Exemption. The area of homestead exemption con-
sidered here is that broad area relative to exemptions of dwellings, or of
real estate or personal property as substitute therefor. These existing
homestead exemptions are to a large extent more archaic and outdated
than the wage earner's exemptions. The usual homestead exemption
provides an upper limit on the value exempt. This varies from a seven
hundred dollar limit in Indiana5 to one of twelve thousand five hundred
dollars in California. 6 The desired homestead exemption will differ in
various jurisdictions at any one time because of differing economic situ-
ations and because other exemptions may be allowed which make the
homestead exemption less essential. Yet if a one thousand dollar home-
stead exemption was desirable in 1930, certainly the same exemption to-
day is totally inadequate. For example, Maine," New Mexico, 8 North
Carolina,"5 Ohio,6" and South Carolina6 today give only a one thousand
dollar value homestead exemption. Arkansas has adjusted to a twenty-
five hundred dollar value limit on the homestead, 2 Missouri to fifteen
hundred or three thousand," and Oklahoma64 and Mississippi, 5 five
thousand. It is evident that these homestead exemption limits are anti-
quated in application to the average present day situation. The same
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1958).
55. IN,. ANN. STAT. § 2-3501 (a) (Burns 1946).
56. CAL. Crv. CoDE § 1260.
57. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 112, § 68 (1954).
58. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6-1 (1953).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-372 (1953).
60. Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.73 (Baldwin 1953).
61. S.C. CODE § 34-1 (1952).
62. ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 4.
63. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.475 (1949).
64. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(1) (Supp. 1957).
65. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 317 (1957).
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problem arises here as in other exemption areas, and that is the inability
of the homestead exemption limit to adjust adequately to the changing
general economic climate. California has attempted to keep pace by fre-
quent legislative adjustments made in 1949 and again in 1953.66 It can-
not be expected, however, that such exemption limits will be kept current
by frequent legislation and as a result wholesale imbalance will continue.
A possible remedy here too would be some self-adjusting, elastic exemp-
tion limit which would expand and contract according to a formula com-
piled from published economic data.
Although homesteads normally have a maximum exemption value,
some jurisdictions give a blanket exemption covering all property quali-
fying as a homestead.67 A complete exemption of the home owner's
dwelling goes beyond the limits of the spirit and need of the homestead
exemption and some dollar value limitation is necessary. Several juris-
dictions have changed from the orthodox homestead exemption to an elec-
tive exemption which takes its place and permits the head of a family to
select any real estate to a certain value as exempt, or to select personal
property to that value if the debtor has no real estate or prefers the per-
sonal property exemption over that of the real estate.6" This would tend
to equalize the actual exemption coverage of the homeowner and the
renter and is worthy of consideration.
There is a great need in most jurisdictions for a modernization of
the homestead exemption laws. The upper value limitation should in al-
most every instance be increased to reflect the current situation and, if
possible, to provide an adjustability which will prevent serious dislocation
as later economic patterns develop. Serious consideration should also be
given to extending some substitute exemption to those not qualified by
ownership to receive a strict homestead exemption.
Occupational Exemptions. Historically, those engaged in certain oc-
cupations and professions have received specially designated exemptions
of certain minimum articles deemed necessary in the particular occupa-
tion or profession. The most usual occupations thus specially treated are
farming, the professions, mechanics, carpenters and generally those using
tools and implements for a livelihood. It is to be kept in mind at this
point that the specific exemption granted to certain occupational areas is
being considered, and not the right of a debtor to select as exempt any
tangible personal property up to a certain value as is provided in some
66. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1260. For an escalator type homestead exemption law, see
UTAH CODE ANN. § 28-1-1 (1953), wherein a $2,000 exemption and a further sum of
$750.00 for a spouse and $300.00 for each member of the family is given.
67. E.g., FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 1; OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(1) (Supp. 1957).
68. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (1950).
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jurisdictions.69 There is no question but that these occupational exemp-
tions by-and-large are antiquated and stultifying. A casual reading of
these exemption statutes seems to be a part of the world of Davy Crockett.
Spinning wheels are exempt in Missouri,"0 agricultural implements not
exceeding two hundred dollars in Ohio,7 and one horse used by a physi-
cian, surgeon or minister in the practice of his profession in California."2
When the legislature gave these exemptions they were seriously given as
needed protection for a debtor. The pathos in the picture is the farmer
of today with only a two hundred dollar implement exemption or the
exemption of a minister's non-existent horse and not his existing car.
The specific item delineation is the method most frequently used in
granting personal property exemptions to the farmer, such as two mules,
harness, two wagons, food for mules, seed, etc.73 If the exemption by
specific item designation is used, it is of great importance that the legis-
lature revise the listed items so as to give the needed protection to the
farmer in his current economic situation. California has done much in
this way by adding one refrigerator and one television receiver,7" one
truck," and one car 6 to the items exempt. Virginia in 1956 added one
tractor to a former two horse exemption. 7 It is evident that a farmer's
exemption granted by naming specific items must be periodically revised
to meet the farm debtor's needs, but whether this specific item exemption
is the desirable method of granting a farmer's exemption is questionable.
With the rapid change in farming methods and equipment, this type
statute will almost certainly be outdated before it will be revised.
Another, and more serviceable type farm exemption is the selective
property exemption whereunder the farmer may elect up to a certain value
the personal property essential to him in his particular farming endeavor.
A maximum exemption value is necessary as the value of trucks, tractors
and power equipment of the farmer may be far beyond any justifiable
exemption. An example of this selective type farmer's exemption is evi-
denced in the Utah Code wherein, "farming utensils . . . not exceed-
ing . ... "" are exempt, and Ohio' provides an exemption of tools
and implements necessary for carrying on farming up to a certain value
69. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3502 (Burns 1946).
70. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513A35(3) (1949).
71. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(E) (Baldwin 1953).
72. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.7.
73. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 690.3.
74. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.2.
75. See note 72 supra.
76. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 690.24.
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-27 (Supp. 1958).
78. 'UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-1(3) (1953).
79. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(E) (Baldwin 1953).
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level. Many of these value limitations are badly in need of upward revi-
sion. For example, Ohio exempts selected farm implements not exceed-
ing two hundred dollars in value,"0 and Utah exempts farm utensils not
exceeding three hundred dollars in value."' However, an open-end imple-
ment exemption as that found in Oklahoma, extending to all farm im-
plements of husbandry used on the homestead, 2 is too broad an exemp-
tion unless "implements" means only items of small value such as tools.
To analyze the true exemption position of a farmer in any jurisdic-
tion, the scope of his homestead exemption, his household exemptions,
and other exemptions granted to broader classes in which he falls must be
included, but the farmer should have a personal property exemption
coverage especially extended to him. A modernized farmer's exemption
statute should grant to a farmer a selective exemption base under which
he could choose the tools, implements, and machinery which he wished
to have exempt. This would not only give the elasticity necessary be-
cause of the multifarious kinds of farming, but also an adaptability to
progressive changes made in farming methods. A maximum value of
the selected items should be specified. No one figure could be suggested,
but it seems it should be substantially more than those now provided.
Over and above this selective exemption area, a farmer should be given
some specific item exemptions. These should include a truck and a trac-
tor each to a certain maximum value. Virginia, for example, exempts
a tractor to the value of five hundred dollars.8 "
The usual exemption laws also give special consideration to those
who earn their living by labor and those engaged in a profession. The
shortcomings of these exemptions are basically the same as in the farmer
exemption provisions. They have not been re-examined and modernized
for many years. Maine 4 and Massachusetts" provide an exemption of
tools necessary for carrying on a business not exceeding one hundred
dollars in value. The Massachusetts one hundred dollar exemption was
fixed in 1855.8 On the other hand, Missouri,"7 Mississippi," and Cali-
80. Ibid.
81. See note 78 supra.
82. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(4) (Supp. 1957).
83. 'VA. CODE ANN. § 34-27 (Supp. 1958). Oklahoma in 1957 amended its Act so as
to remove a yoke of oxen from the exemption, but continued the exemption of two
horses and two mules. Nothing was said as to trucks or tractors. See OKLA. STAT. tit.
31, § 1 (8), (9) (1951), as amended (Supp. 1957).
84. MNE. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 112, § 67(1) VI (1954).
85. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 235, § 34 (1955).
86. See historical note to MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 235, § 34 (1955).
87. Mo. P'Lnv. STAT. §§ 513A30, 513.435(7) (1949).
88. MESS. CODE ANN. § 307 (1957).
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fornia89 provide open-end exemptions covering all tools necessary in
carrying on a trade or used for a livelihood. Professional books neces-
sary to a practice are exempted in Missouri,9" while New Mexico exempts
doctors' books and instruments not exceeding one hundred dollars in
value,9" and Ohio exempts implements necessary for carrying on a pro-
fession not exceeding two hundred dollars in value. 2
These illustrations are fair samples of current exemptions provided
for mechanics and professional men and emphasize the need for moderni-
zation. In all probability a generalized exemption allowing the profes-
sional man or the mechanic the privilege of selecting up to a stated
amount the tools, equipment, implements, and books which he desires to
keep free from his creditors is satisfactory. An alternative method of
perhaps greater utility is to establish a flexible limitation by exempting
the necessary tools, implements, and books. This limitation may be op-
posed as being too vague, and not giving the creditor a sufficiently clear
picture of available assets. On the other hand, an absolute dollar value
limitation is likely to become totally out of balance before it is again
considered for revision. Under a flexible limitation a court could survey
each debtor's particular situation and grant protection sufficient to en-
able him to keep together the essentials of his trade or profession, as
they were found to be necessary at the time. Such an exemption would
also lend itself to adequate treatment of the various types of mechanics
and the diversified nature of the professions.
Personal Insurance Exemptions. The exemption of life insurance
has long been considered essential to protect the family of the insured
and to provide funds after death to its members. Few would question
the desirability of such exemption and the liberal construction of the
courts has to some extent vitalized life insurance exemptions and adapted
them to changing insurance concepts without the aid of legislative change.
Yet it is important at this time for most jurisdictions to carefully re-
evaluate their life insurance exemption provisions and adjust them to
today's needs and today's insurance practices.
The familiar problem of the amount of the exemption is present
here. Many jurisdictions exempt life insurance and do not restrict the
amount exempt. For example, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
89. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.4.
90. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.435 (11) (1949).
91. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-6 (1953).
92. OEio REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(E) (Baldwin 1953). Utah exempts one ve-
hicle used by a physician, surgeon or minister in making professional visits. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-23-1(6) (1953).
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Oklahoma and Pennsylvania provide no limitation on the amount of life
insurance which is exempt.93  Other states circumscribe the exemption
scope to a maximum dollar value. Mississippi exempts life insurance not
exceeding ten thousand dollars,9" while South Carolina exempts to twenty-
five thousand dollars." It is interesting to note that the Mississippi ten
thousand dollar limitation was last amended in 1930,9" while the South
Carolina twenty-five thousand dollar maximum exemption was granted
in 1947."7 It is obvious that the coverage intended to be given in 1930
is largely dissipated today and even that of 1947 is no longer reflected
in 1959. Some states limit the amount of life insurance exempt by pre-
mium payment restrictions. Thus, California, Missouri and Utah ex-
empt life insurance up to the amount which is purchased from an annual
premium not exceeding the sum of five hundred dollars.98
There is danger in the wide open exemption where tlie scales are
weighted in favor of the debtor and his family. There is also a proved
danger in any fixed maximum exemption as it is quickly outdated with
the resultant shrinking of the true exemption protection. This, as his-
tory shows, is weighted to the advantage of the creditor. There is no
question, however, that most of those states providing a value limitation
on life insurance exemptions are in need of reevaluation and moderniza-
tion. The basic concern of life insurance exemption being the family
unit, it seems no limitation should be provided on this exemption; thus as
the position of the individual changes with the general economic trends,
he will be able to provide exempt insurance coverage which he deems nec-
essary for his family. The wholesale misuse of such an unlimited exemp-
tion will be prevented under the usual fraudulent conveyance remedies.99
It would be expected that only life insurance coming to the insured's
estate or naming members of the family as beneficiaries would be exempt.
This is not the usual situation, however, as most life insurance exemption
laws exempt the proceeds and cash surrender value of any life insurance
93. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 624 (1940) ; Aaic. STAT. ANN. § 30-208 (1947) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 222.13 (Supp. 1958) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 56-905 (1935) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4210
(Bums 1946) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 60, § 232 (1954) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 408:1
(1955); N.Y. INs. LAW § 166; N.C. CoNsT. art. X, § 7; OHio Rzv. CODE ANN. § 3911.10
(Baldwin Supp. 1955) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 211 (1951) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 517
(1954).
94. Miss. CODE ANN. § 308 (1957).
95. S.C. CODE § 37-169 (1952).
96. See historical note to Miss. CODE ANN. § 308 (1957).
97. See historical note to S.C. CODE § 37-169 (1952).
98. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 690.19; Mo. REv. STAT. § 376.560 (1949); UTAH CoDE
ANN. § 78-23-1(8) (1953).
99. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 166(4).
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policy, regardless of the named beneficiaries.' ° Some jurisdictions do
reflect a narrower coverage and extend the life insurance exemption only
to policies taken out for the benefit of the wife or children, or any rela-
tive dependent upon the insured, or a creditor,'0 ' or some other designated
members of the family class.0 2 Because life insurance contracts nor-
mally are intended to cover such long periods of time and the circum-
stances of the insured and his marital and family status change, it is
probably desirable that the life insurance exemption should be granted
irrespective of the named beneficiary. Although members of the family
may not at a particular time be named beneficiaries, the probability is
that they will benefit at some later time if the insurance is not forfeited
under pressure of the insured's creditors.
In considering a modern life insurance exemption, the question as
to the creditors who are precluded from seizing the insurance or its pro-
ceeds should be considered. A loosely designated provision exempting
insurance benefits from execution leaves the problem as to whose credi-
tors are precluded. This is illustrated in an early California case which
liberally extended the exemption from execution to include an exemption
from the creditors of the party to whom the insurance was payable."0 3
There are three classes of creditors to be considered in determining the
scope of the exemption of life insurance. They are the crditors of the
insured, the creditors of the person effecting the insurance and the credi-
tors of the beneficiary. The usual statutory provision recognizes the
creditors of the insured and exempts the policy, its cash surrender value
and proceeds from them only.' Others, intending to give a broad
scope of coverage to the exemption, permit the beneficiary to receive the
proceeds of life insurance free also from the creditors of such benefici-
ary.0  Florida provides that life insurance and its proceeds are in no
case liable to attachment, garnishment or any legal process in favor of
any creditors of the person whose life is insured.' 5 Georgia exempts life
insurance from creditors of the insured and of the person effecting the
100. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-208 (1947) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.14 (1943);
GA. CODE ANN. § 56-905 (1935) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 308 (1957) ; N.Y. INS. LAW §
166(1) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 211 (1951).
101. IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4210 (1946); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.10 (Bald-
win Supp. 1955) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 517 (1954).
102. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 408.1 (1955) exempts life insurance payable to a
married woman. N.C. CONST. art. X, § 7 exempts life insurance for wife and children.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 376.560 (1949) exempts policies for the benefit of the wife of the in-
sured.
103. Holmes v. Marshall, 145 Cal. 777, 70 Pac. 534 (1905).
104. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4210 (Burns 1946) ; OHio REv. CODE ANN. §
3911.10 (Baldwin Supp. 1955) ; PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 40, § 517 (1954).
105. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-482 (1950).
106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.13 (Supp. 1958).
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insurance. 0 ' Ohio exempts from all claims of the creditors of the in-
sured, '' as also do Pennsylvania,"' Mississippi,' and Indiana."' On
the other hand, New York carefully sets out the exemption coverage in
respect to these three classes by freeing the insurance policy and its pro-
ceeds under designated circumstances from creditors of the person in-
sured, from the creditors of the person effecting the insurance, and the
creditors of the beneficiary."' Virginia goes far in exempting certain
life insurance policies and proceeds from creditors of the insured and of
the beneficiary both before and after payment."' Whether the life in-
surance exemption should extend to exclude creditors of the beneficiary
from the right to seize the proceeds of the policy is debatable. If the
beneficiary is to be protected as against his own creditors, the exemption
should only be extended to certain members of the insured's natural
bounty, as his wife and children.
In recent years, the personal insurance contracts have changed sub-
stantially in form. Endowment and annuity contracts have become com-
monplace. With legislative inaction, the "life insurance" exemption in
early statutes lost its clarity and mongrelized insurance contracts raised
the issue of whether the life insurance exemption extended to them. By
a flexible approach, the courts are able to extend a necessary exemption
coverage to these varying insurance contracts,"' but the problem should
be carefully settled by legislative action. Some jurisdictions have con-
sidered this problem. New York specifically exempts life insurance and
annuity contracts,'- as do Massachusetts". and New Mexico."' Georgia
provides that life or endowment insurance is exempt," 8 while Ohio, in
modernizing its insurance exemption law, provides for the exemption of
life insurance contracts, endowment insurance or annuity contracts." 9 At
the present time, however, most jurisdictions provide an exemption by
the indefinite term-"life insurance." If the exemption is to be ex-
tended to these newly developed types of insurance contracts, it may be
107. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-905 (1935). The entire insurance code of Georgia is now
in the process of revision by a legislative committee (1959). The author has appeared
before this Committee.
108. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.10 (Baldwin Supp. 1955).
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 517 (1954).
110. MISS. CODE ANN. § 308 (1957).
111. IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4210 (Burns 1946).
112. N.Y. INS. LAW § 166.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-482 (1950).
114. See, e.g., Fox v. Swartz, 235 Minn. 237, 51 N.W.2d 80 (1952).
115. N.Y. INS. LAW § 166(3).
116. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 119(A) (1955).
117. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-3 (1953).
118. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-905 (1935).
119. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.10 (Baldwin Supp. 1955).
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desirable to define the nature of the contract to be exempt as has New
York, 2 ' or to state only the general type of insurance, as endowment or
annuity contracts, and thus leave to the courts the job of characterizing
the conglomerate insurance policies as they develop.
Other types of personal insurance have become common today which
are not included in the broad area of life insurance. These are the grow-
ing volume of disability, health, and accident insurance contracts. Most
exemption statutes in effect today, were enacted before the use of such
insurance coverage was common and make no provision for them. Thus
no protection to the debtor at the time of sickness or disability is granted.
California has considered the problem and exempts all money or bene-
fits growing out of disability or health insurance to the amount of a five
hundred dollar annual premium,' 2' while Florida exempts disability in-
come benefits under any policy or contract of health or accident insur-
ance.'22 Several other jurisdictions have recognized an exemption need
in this area of health and accident insurance and have granted such ex-
emptions. 2 It is important for those many jurisdictions which have not
considered this area to do so promptly, and it is likely such consideration
would result in extending the exemption at least in some degree to the
health, accident and disability contracts of the debtor.
EXCEPTIONS FROM EXEMPTIONS
Many classes and types of creditors have been permitted to pierce
the protective shield of the exemption or have not been excluded by its
coverage. These creditors may be differentiated on the basis of their
claim, such as contract on the one hand, or tort on the other, or accord-
ing to certain types of claims such as claims arising on the furnishing of
necessities, claims arsing for wages earned, claims arising on alimony
obligations, etc. Most jurisdictions do grant special exceptions to the
exemption coverage, and some currently have a very restricted group of
creditors against whom the general exemption is effective.
Indiana's general exemption statute provides an exemption to stated
amounts for any debt growing out of or founded upon a contract ex-
press or implied. 4 Alabama also extends its general exemption coverage
to protect from the collection of debts,'25 and thus gives no protection to
120. N.Y. INs. LAW § 166(3).
121. CAL. CIw. FROC. CODE § 690.20.
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.18 (1943).
123. See, e.g, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-208 (1947); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 60, §
232 (1954); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 110(A) (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-3
(1953); N.Y. INs. LAW § 166(2).
124. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3501 (Bums 1946).
125. ALA. CODE fit. 7, § 629 (1940).
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the debtor as against ex delicto claims.'26 However, the current approach
to this problem has been to grant the exemption protection as against
both tort and contract claims. To implement the philosophy of reserving
unto the debtor certain basic necessities, the blanket exemption from both
tort and contract creditors is preferable.
There are many specific types of creditors' claims which may be the
basis for seizing property protected by the general exemption laws. This
may be in the nature of a removal of the general exemption protection
from the specific claim,127 or the removal of the exemption of a specific
item as against a specific claim.'28 Thus Illinois withdraws its exemption
from all personal property as against a debt for wages of any laborer,'29
and Massachusetts, although exempting disability insurance benefits as a
general matter, provides that the exemption shall not apply for necessities
contracted during disability. 30
An exception for necessaries is common. 3' The scope of this ex-
ception is usually circumscribed by providing that all debts incurred by
the debtor, his wife or family, for common necessities, are not subject
to exemption provisions.3 2 It is suggested that special consideration be
given the claim based on the furnishing of necessities, but with some
maximum limitation, or by providing that some minimum assets be pro-
tected even from this necessity based claim. This would not only give a
debtor a basis for obtaining necessities on credit during critical times, but
would in general recognize the merit of the credit base. California has a
controlled "necessaries" exception wherein it is provided that, although
benefits growing out of disability or health insurance are exempt from
creditors, debts incurred for the common necessities of life may be satis-
fied out of one-half of such benefits. " New York also has a provision
which excepts, from the general exemption of benefits payable under dis-
ability insurance, liabilities incurred for necessaries furnished after the
commencement of the disability.' The exception of debts based upon
the furnishing of necessities should be limited to those contracted within
a certain period of time so that years of accumulated necessity obligations
126. Brown Shoe Co. v. Schaefer, 242 Ala. 310, 6 So. 2d 405 (1942).
127. See, e.g., FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 1.
128. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §§ 690.02, 690.11.
129. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 16, 18 (Smith-Hurd 1951).
130. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 110(A) (1955).
131. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDn §§ 690.11, 690.20; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6-7 (1953) and
9 26-2-27 (Supp. 1957) ; N.Y. INS. LAW § 166(2).
132. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 690.11; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6-7 (1953).
133. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.20.
134. N.Y. INs. LAw § 166(2).
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would not steam-roller the debtor long after the furnishing of the
necessities.
Debts incurred for manual labor are also obligations frequently
given special consideration in the exemption laws. Thus, California and
New Mexico, although exempting earnings of the debtor, provide that
no earnings are exempt as against claims for personal services or manual
labor rendered for the debtor,'35 and Illinois provides that no personal
property shall be exempt from a debt for wages of any laborer or ser-
vant."3 6 Ohio subjects the homestead to claims for manual work,'13 7 Penn-
sylvania provides no exemptions against certain claims for wages or
manual labor, 3 ' and Virginia withdraws its homestead exemption as to
claims for services rendered by a laboring person or mechanic. 3 ' The
fault of the provisions is that they allow the wage claimant to subject the
debtor's assets to claims not limited in amount. Some curtailment of this
exception should be provided. This could be done by providing that cer-
tain assets, or assets to a certain value, are to be exempt even from the
claims based on personal services. The result would be that certain prop-
erty exempt by the general exemption laws would be made subject to
claims for wages earned, but certain other exempt property would not be
liable to such claims. The wage claim exception may also be narrowed by
a provision limiting the amount of wage claims which will be permitted
against otherwise exempt property. Both Ohio 4 ° and Pennsylvania'4 '
illustrate such a limitation on the exception to wage claims by providing
that only claims for wages or manual labor for one hundred dollars or
less are to receive the special privilege of seizure of otherwise exempt
property. The amount of the claim over one hundred dollars is subject
to the general exemption provisions.
Tax claims are normally excepted from exemption provisions.'42
Some jurisdictions have singled out married women's maintenance claims,
or alimony liabilities as deserving of favorable treatment. 43 Thus,
Pennsylvania provides that any person against whom alimony, or wife
or child support is claimed is not entitled to the benefit of any exemption
135. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.11; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6-7 (1953).
136. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 16, 18 (Smith-Hurd 1951).
137. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.72 (Baldwin 1953).
138. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 232 (1954).
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-5 (1950).
140. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.73 (Baldwin 1953).
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 232 (1954). Missouri provides no exemption as
against laborers' claims for wages up to ninety dollars. Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.470 (1949).
142. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3515 (Burns 1946) and § 64-1511 (Burns
1951); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1; OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 5 (1951).
143. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.140 (1949) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 136
(1954).
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law as against such claims,' and Missouri provides that no property
shall be exempt as against a married woman's claim for maintenance or
alimony."' Certainly this area of wife and child support obligations is
one which could logically and justifiably be granted special attention, giv-
ing a wife or children a better status than other creditors as against the
property of the husband or father. Whether all exemptions should be
withdrawn from one obligated under support or alimony decrees is an-
other matter. Some minimal necessaries should be exempt even from
these highly meritorious claims.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From the current study and review of the exemption laws of twenty-
two states selected on a diversified geographical, economic and popula-
tion base,"' certain generalizations and conclusions may be drawn. It
is evident that nearly every jurisdiction is long overdue a re-evaluation
and analysis of its exemption laws. Some few jurisdictions have peri-
odically reviewed and adjusted certain portions of their exemption laws
so as to reflect current needs, but none were found to have reconsidered
the full scope of the exemption problem so as to give an over-all modern
perspective to the general institution granting exemptions to the personal
debtor. Too often the legislative lag has permitted the debtor-creditor
relationship to be crystallized so that current needs and institutions are
no longer reflected. It is evident that there is an urgency for a moderni-
zation of exemption laws, an urgency singularly and forcefully shown by
even a casual observation of the archaic provisions and values still extant
in the laws of most jurisdictions. A general review and modernization
of the exemption laws would prevent such anachronism, fairly adjust the
debtor-creditor relationship in the area of exemptions, and give some
elasticity of application in the future.
In step with current economic and social realizations, the exemption
laws should insofar as possible be flexible in nature so that with economic
changes the same real exemption will continue to be available to debtors.
The old crystallized exemption provisions which become outmoded in a
few short years should, as far as possible, be abandoned. The risk of
fluid exemption laws to creditors seeking a future certainty is recognized.
A more extensive use of some intermediate type of exemption law which
gives fluidity in the changing economic picture and still gives the creditor
reasonable grounds for forecasting available assets is the present need.
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 136 (1954).
145. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.140 (1949).
146. See note 1 supra.
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Escalator and percentage exemption provisions should be more exten-
sively utilized and experimentation with current, reliable indices to which
exemption values could be tied is advisable.
